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Abstract:	Divine	Command	Theories	(DCTs)	comes	in	several	different	forms	but	at	their	core	all	of	these	theories	claims	that	certain	moral	statuses	(most	typically	the	status	of	being	obligatory)	exist	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	God	has	commanded	them	to	exist.	Several	authors	argue	that	this	core	version	of	the	DCT	is	vulnerable	to	an	epistemological	objection.	According	to	this	objection,	DCT	is	deficient	because	certain	groups	of	moral	agents	lack	epistemic	access	to	God’s	commands.	But	there	is	confusion	as	to	the	precise	nature	and	significance	of	this	objection,	and	critiques	of	its	key	premises.	In	this	article	I	try	to	clear	up	this	confusion	and	address	these	critiques.	I	do	so	in	three	ways.	First,	I	offer	a	simplified	general	version	of	the	objection.	Second,	I	address	the	leading	criticisms	of	the	premises	of	this	objection,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	role	of	moral	risk/uncertainty	in	our	understanding	of	God’s	commands.	And	third,	I	outline	four	possible	interpretations	of	the	argument,	each	with	a	differing	degree	of	significance	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT.			
	
	 1.	Introduction			 This	article	critiques	Divine	Command	Theories	(DCTs)	of	metaethics	on	the	grounds	that	they	involve	an	intimate	connection	between	moral	epistemology	and	moral	ontology.	More	precisely,	it	argues	that	all	DCTs	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology	and	because	of	this	they	are	vulnerable	to	an	objection,	viz.	an	important	class	of	moral	agents	fail	to	satisfy	this	epistemic	condition.	This	casts	into	doubt	the	metaethical	adequacy	of	DCTs,	and	has	significant	implications	for	anyone	wishing	to	rely	upon	them.			 This	objection	to	DCT	is	not	new	(see:	Morriston	2009;	Peoples	2011;	and	Wielenberg	2014).	It	is	referred	to	as	the	‘Epistemological	Objection’	(Morriston	2009;	Peoples	2011),	though	there	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	name	is	appropriate	given	the	argument’s	implications	(Wielenberg	2014).	In	this	article,	
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I	hope	to	clear	up	some	of	the	confusion	associated	with	this	objection,	and	provide	a	strengthened	defence	of	it.	I	do	so	in	four	parts.	First,	I	offer	a	simple,	general	version	of	the	objection.	This	consists	of	two	premises	and	a	conclusion.	Second,	I	defend	the	first	premise	of	the	argument,	highlighting	the	important	connections	between	moral	ontology	and	epistemology	in	the	DCT.	Third,	I	defend	the	second	premise,	illustrating	the	problem	with	the	primary	objection	to	it	from	proponents	of	DCT	and	showing	how	recent	insights	into	the	phenomenon	of	moral	risk/uncertainty	might	illuminate	key	features	of	this	premise.	Fourth,	and	finally,	I	consider	the	implications	of	the	argument.	Does	it	offer	a	strong	objection	to	DCT?	Or	can	proponents	of	DCT	simply	shrug	their	shoulders	and	say	‘So	what?’			
	 2.	What	is	the	Epistemological	Objection?	
		 To	understand	the	epistemological	objection,	we	must	first	understand	DCT.	Here,	I	take	DCT	to	be	a	label	that	can	attach	to	a	family	of	metaethical	theories,	each	of	which	is	concerned	with	accounting	for,	explaining,	or	grounding	the	existence	of	one	or	more	species	of	moral	fact	by	reference	to	God’s	commands	(Murphy	2012).			 Moral	facts	come	in	two	main	flavours.	There	are	value-based	facts,	which	concern	whether	a	particular	states	of	affairs	is	good	or	bad	or	neutral.	And	there	are	deontic	facts,	which	concern	whether	or	not	particular	actions	are	obligatory,	
forbidden,	permissible,	supererogatory	(and	so	on).1	Although	it	is	possible	for	a	DCT	to	be	structured	in	such	a	way	that	it	accounts	for	both	value-based	and	deontic	facts,	this	is	not	now	the	norm.	The	main	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	classic	Euthyphro	dilemma,	which	challenges	proponents	of	DCT	to	account	for	the	necessity	of	certain	moral	values	or	duties	(e.g.	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing	innocent	children	for	fun).	If	DCT	is	true,	and	if	God	is	free	to	command	anything,	then	it	seems	like	the	duty	to	refrain	from	torturing	children	could	be	contingent.																																																									
1 Deontic logic is multivalent. According to some theories there are more than the four deontic statuses mentioned 
in the text, hence the ‘and so on’. 
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That	does	not	sit	well	with	many	people’s	foundational	moral	intuitions.2	Many	DCTists	resolve	this	dilemma	by	appealing	to	God’s	nature.	They	argue	that	God’s	nature	necessarily	exemplifies	or	insantiates	certain	properties	like	lovingkindness	and	that	these	properties	in	turn	ensure	that	God	would	never	command	something	terrible	like	the	torture	of	innocent	children.	This	approach	is	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Robert	Adams	(1999),	though	it	has	been	defended	by	others	(e.g.	Alston	1991;	Quinn	2006).			 The	upshot	is	a	more	complex	understanding	of	the	possible	relationships	between	God	and	moral	facts.	God’s	commands	are	now	thought	to	ground	a	limited	set	of	moral	facts,	most	typically	the	fact	that	some	actions	are	obligatory,	while	other	aspects	of	God’s	nature	are	thought	to	account	for	other	moral	facts.	Wielenberg	(2014)	offers	a	useful	categorisation	of	these	theories.	He	argues	that	there	is	a	general	category	of	theological	stateist	theories	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God’s	states	(e.g.	values	might	be	said	to	be	dependent	on	God’s	essential	nature);	within	this	general	category	there	is	a	more	discrete	category	of	theological	voluntarist	theories,	which	hold	that	moral	facts	are	dependent	for	their	existence	on	one	or	more	of	God’s	voluntary	acts	(e.g.	his	intending	or	willing	that	X	be	so);	and	finally,	within	the	category	of	voluntarist	theories,	there	is	the	even	more	circumscribed	category	of	DCTs,	which	focus	specifically	on	God’s	commands.			 Taking	this	onboard,	in	this	article	I	assume	that	all	DCTs	are	relatively	narrow	in	scope.	They	focus	solely	on	the	relationship	between	God’s	commands	and	moral	facts.	And,	in	light	of	the	responses	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma,	they	only	really	focus	on	one	type	of	moral	fact,	namely	obligations.	They	try	to	argue	that	moral	obligations	are	grounded	in	God’s	commands	(Adams	1999;	Quinn	2006).	The	essence	of	the	DCT	is	thus	that	without	a	divine	command	there	would	be	no	moral	obligation.	Adams	(1999)	is	most	explicit	about	this	commitment,	holding	that	a	divine	command	is	essential	because	without	it	there	would	be	no	discernible	difference	between	a	supererogatory	act	(one	that	is																																																									
2 Though whether we should trust those intuitions is a separate question. See Joyce 2002 for an analysis and 
critique of the Euthyphro dilemma. 
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above	and	beyond	the	call	of	moral	duty)	and	an	obligatory	one.	I	will	return	to	this	feature	of	Adams’s	theory	below,	but	even	if	some	DCTists	reject	this	particular	claim	concerning	the	necessity	of	the	divine	command	for	distinguishing	between	supererogations	and	obligations,	I	believe	they	will	accept	the	dependency-relationship	between	obligations	and	divine	commands.			 It	is	this	dependency-relationship	that	gives	rise	to	the	epistemological	objection.	Put	most	simply,	this	objection	holds	that	certain	classes	of	moral	agent	(specifically,	reasonable	non-believers)	lack	epistemic	access	to	God’s	commands.	In	other	words,	they	do	not	know	or	cannot	reasonably	be	expected	to	know,	what	God	has	commanded.	The	result	is	that,	if	the	DCT	is	true,	then	for	this	class	of	moral	agents,	moral	obligations	no	longer	exist.	It	is,	however,	wrong	to	suppose	that	reasonable	non-believers	have	no	moral	obligations.	Consequently,	something	must	be	rotten	at	the	heart	of	the	DCT.	That’s	the	essence	of	the	epistemological	objection.			 There	is	some	confusion	as	to	whether	this	objection	is	strictly	epistemological	(Peoples	2011)	or	ontological	in	nature	(Wielenberg	2014).	There	is	also	some	confusion	as	to	how	serious	the	objection	really	is	(Peoples	2011).	I	hope	to	clear	up	this	confusion	in	what	follows.	I	will	argue	that	the	objection	is	both	epistemological	and	ontological	in	nature,	and	that	it	can	be	quite	serious.	This	is	because	there	is	an	important	connection	between	epistemology	and	ontology	in	the	DCT	(and,	indeed,	in	most	metaethical	theories);	and	the	significance	of	this	depends	largely	on	what	type	of	theist	you	are.	To	facilitate	making	these	arguments,	I	will	work	with	the	following	simple	and	generalised	version	of	the	objection.	This	version	formalises	some	of	the	preceding	discussion	and	is	relatively	abstract	and	non-committal	in	its	scope.	This	contrasts	it	with	previous,	narrower	versions	(Morriston	2009):		 (1)	DCTs,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	include	an	epistemic	condition	in	their	account	of	moral	obligations,	viz.	you	must	either	know	or	successfully	receive	communication	(implying	knowledge)	of	divine	commands	in	order	for	you	to	be	morally	bound.		
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	(2)	There	are	such	things	as	reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non-believers	who	do	not	violate	any	epistemic	duties	in	their	non-belief)	and	for	these	reasonable	non-believers	(RNBs),	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT	is	not	possible.		(3)	Therefore,	on	DCT,	there	are	no	moral	obligations	for	reasonable	non-believers.		In	the	remainder	of	the	article	I	clarify	and	defend	the	two	premises	of	this	argument,	and	assess	its	overall	implications.				
	 3.	Why	is	an	epistemic	condition	essential?			 The	first	premise	of	the	argument	states	that	all	DCTs	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology.	It	is	important	to	understand	what	this	means.	It	is	not	simply	that	it	would	be	a	good	or	desirable	thing	for	people	to	know	what	God	has	commanded.	It	is	that	without	knowledge	of	the	command,	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist.	Suppose	God	has	commanded	you	to	give	10%	of	your	income	to	charity.	Premise	(1)	is	saying	that	under	DCT	this	would	give	rise	to	an	obligation	only	if	you	have	knowledge	of	the	command.	Premise	(1)	is	thus	pointing	to	an	intimate	connection	between	moral	epistemology	and	moral	ontology	in	the	case	of	the	DCT.			 What	can	be	said	in	favour	of	premise	(1)?	For	one	thing,	proponents	of	DCT	already	seem	to	accept	it.	This	is	certainly	the	case	for	Robert	Adams,	perhaps	the	most	famous	contemporary	defender	of	a	modified	DCT.	His	theory	is	explicitly	social	and	communicative	in	nature.	He	says	that	having	an	obligation	is	something	that	only	arises	in	a	social	context,	i.e	in	the	context	of	an	interpersonal	relationship	between	two	or	more	individuals.	And	that	consequently	being	placed	under	an	obligation	‘essentially	involves	
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communicative	acts’	(Adams	1999,	262).3	One	person	must	explicitly	tell	another	person	what	is	required	of	them	in	order	for	the	other	to	be	bound.	In	the	case	of	moral	obligations,	the	only	person	with	the	right	kind	of	authority	and	nature	to	issue	such	directives	is	God.	Hence,	being	under	a	moral	obligation	requires	that	one	is	in	a	communicative	relationship	with	God.	This	implies	that	one	must	have	epistemic	access	to	the	relevant	communicative	acts,	i.e.	God’s	commands.	It	is	very	difficult	to	see	how	this	account	of	moral	obligations	could	be	sustained	without	incorporating	an	epistemic	condition.	The	result,	I	believe,	is	that	anyone	who	favours	an	Adamsian	version	of	DCT	should	accept	premise	(1).			 But	the	Adamsian	version	is	not	the	only	game	in	town.	Peoples	(2011)	argues	that	at	least	some	versions	of	DCT	do	not	incorporate	an	explicit	epistemic	condition.	An	example	is	supposedly	the	theory	defended	by	Quinn	(2006).	The	key	claim	in	this	theory	is	that	ontology	and	epistemology	are	
separate	and	separable.	How	something	comes	to	be	(an	ontological	matter)	is	distinct	from	how	we	come	to	know	of	its	existence	(an	epistemological	matter).	As	Quinn	himself	says:		
“Our	theory	asserts	that	divine	commands	are	conditions	causally	
necessary	and	sufficient	for	moral	obligations	and	prohibitions	to	be	
in	force.	It	makes	no	claims	at	all	about	how	we	might	come	to	know	
just	what	God	has	commanded...	After	all,	it	is	a	philosophical	truism	
that	the	causal	order	and	the	order	of	learning	need	not	be	the	same.”			(Quinn	2006,	44-45)		This	seems	emphatic,	but	two	interpretative	points	need	to	be	made.	First,	it	is	not	clear	from	this	passage	whether	Quinn	completely	rejects	an	epistemic	condition.	Elsewhere	in	the	same	section	of	text	he	talks	about	how	someone	could	first	come	to	know	that	something	is	forbidden	and	then	come	to	know	that	it	was	commanded	by	God.	This	suggests	that	he	thinks	knowledge	of	an	obligation	is	essential,	but	knowledge	of	the	source	is	not.	If	so,	then	he	does	not																																																									
3 Note: this quote was originally sourced through Morriston 2009 
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really	reject	the	epistemic	condition.	He	merely	offers	a	modified	version	of	it.	His	objection	then	collapses	into	the	‘content-not-source’	objection	which	I	discuss	in	the	next	section.	Second,	there	is	some	dispute	in	the	literature	as	to	the	correct	classification	of	Quinn’s	moral	theory.	Although	Quinn	referred	to	it	as	a	command	theory	(Peoples	2011),	others	such	as	Morriston	(2009)	have	suggested	that	it	really	belongs	to	the	more	general	non-command-based	voluntarist	family.				 Even	if	we	grant	that	the	Quinn-type	theory	belongs	to	the	more	general	category	of	non-command-based	voluntarist	theories	it	probably	makes	no	difference	because		something	like	the	epistemic	condition	is	going	to	be	essential	to	all	voluntarist	theories.	The	main	reason	for	my	confidence	in	this	regard	is	that	most	metaethicists	now	concede	that	a	plausible	account	of	moral	ontology	almost	always	requires	the	satisfaction	of	an	epistemic	condition.	If	DCTists	want	to	deny	this	connection,	so	be	it:	their	theory	will	be	weaker	as	a	result.	I	defend	this	view	in	two	ways:	by	appealing	to	common	methodologies	of	argument	in	the	field	of	metaethics,	and	by	analogy	to	an	ongoing	dispute	within	that	field	between	moral	realists	and	antirealists.			 Let’s	look	at	methodology	first.	As	Joyce	(2002;	2006)	notes,	most	contemporary	metaethicists	approach	the	task	of	finding	an	appropriate	grounding	for	moral	facts	in	a	similar	manner	(e.g.	Joyce	2002	and	2006;	Beyleveld	1991;	Smith	1994;	Enoch	2011;	Adams	1999).	First,	they	identify	a	set	of	moral	platitudes,	i.e.	widely	accepted	statements	about	the	nature	of	moral	requirements.	Examples	would	include	things	like	‘moral	obligations	are	other-
regarding’,	‘morality	is	impartial’,	‘moral	obligations	are	conatively	independent’,	and	‘moral	obligations	are	universal	in	scope	(i.e.	they	apply	to	all	similarly	situated	moral	agents)’	and	so	on.4		These	lists	of	moral	platitudes	can	be	more	or	less	exhaustive	(compare	Smith	1994	and	Enoch	2011)	and	there	can	be	disputes	about	which	ones	should	be	included.	Nevertheless,	once	the	platitudes	have	been	identified,	the	metaethicist’s	job	is	to	work	out	a	grounding	that	best	accounts	for	these	platitudes.	This	is	no	easy	task,	with	some	arguing	that	no																																																									
4 This particular list of moral platitudes is taken, with some modifications, from Beyleveld 1991. 
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plausible	grounding	can	be	found	(Joyce	2002	and	2006)	and	others	arguing	that	the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	a	theory	that	accounts	for	a	majority	of	them	and	so	wins	out	because	it	has	the	most	‘plausibility	points’	(Enoch	2011).			 Who	wins	the	war	is	not	hugely	important	in	the	present	context.	What	is	important	is	that	the	DCT	will	be	much	less	likely	to	win	the	war	if	it	excludes	an	epistemic	condition.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	most	widely-accepted	lists	of	the	key	moral	platitudes	–	particularly	those	relating	to	moral	obligations	–include	conditions	that	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	require	epistemic	access	to	the	demands	of	morality.	There	are	two	illustrations	of	this.	One	is	that	it	is	widely-agreed	that	moral	obligations	are	action-guiding	and	motivationally	salient.	That	is	to	say,	they	have	some	sort	of	effect	on	how	we	choose	to	behave	(even	if	they	do	not	completely	overwhelm	our	other	internal	reasons	for	action).	It	is	not	clear	how	moral	obligations	could	have	these	properties	if	the	people	to	whom	they	are	directed	lack	epistemic	access	to	their	content.	Similarly,	there	is	the	widely-accepted	Kantian	maxim	that	‘ought	implies	can’.	This	suggests	that	in	order	for	something	to	count	as	a	moral	obligation	we	must	have	the	ability	to	follow	it.	This	‘ability’	consists	in	the	power	to	control	one’s	actions	in	the	way	specified	by	the	obligation	and	also,	crucially,	the	ability	to	know	what	the	obligation	demands.5	So	an	epistemic	condition	looks	like	it	would	be	an	important	part	of	any	plausible	list	of	moral	platitudes,	and	hence	something	that	any	sound	metaethical	grounding	for	moral	obligations	would	account	for.				 This	importance	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	the	absence	of	a	plausible	account	of	moral	epistemology	is	at	the	heart	of	one	of	the	most	contentious	contemporary	debates	in	metaethics:	the	debate	between	realists	and	antirealists.	Recent	years	have	witnessed	a	resurgence	in	defences	of	non-natural	moral	realism	(e.g.	Shafer-Landau	2003;	Parfit	2011;	Enoch	2011;	Wielenberg	2014).	According	to	this	theory,	moral	facts,	including	both	values																																																									
5 For a defence of the claim that ‘ought implies can’ also implies knowledge, see Howard-Snyder 1997. In that 
paper, Howard-Snyder specifically critiques objective consequentialism, arguing that people cannot follow the 
core imperative of objective consequentialism because they don’t always know which action produces the best 
consequences. This view has been criticized on the grounds that Howard-Snyder confuses know-how with know-
that in her argument (Andríc 2016). But even defenders of this criticism concede that know-which (i.e. knowledge 
of which actions are required by a given moral principle) is essential to the ‘ought implies can’ maxim (Andríc 
2017). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point. 
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and	obligations,	are	akin	to	Platonic	mathematical	facts.	They	are	abstract,	mind-independent	and	metaphysically	necessary	features	of	reality.	They	do	not	depend	for	their	existence	on	other	more	metaphysically	basic	facts	(except	to	the	extent	that	some	moral	facts	depend	on	other	moral	facts).	Moral	antirealists	have	an	opposing	view:	they	think	that	moral	facts	(particularly	obligations)	are	constructed	out	of	practical	attitudes	shared	by	most	human	agents	(Street,	2006;	Southwood	2010).	Antirealists	sometimes	argue	that	the	non-natural	realist	position	is	problematic	because	it	fails	to	provide	a	plausible	account	of	moral	epistemology	(Street	2006;	Joyce	2006).	Realists	generally	agree	(Enoch	2011)	that	we	must	have	epistemic	access	to	moral	truth;	that	we	must	know,	innately	or	through	serious	reflection	what	is	morally	required	of	us.	But	how	does	this	come	to	be	the	case?	On	the	realist	view,	it	seems	to	be	a	mere	coincidence	that	our	moral	beliefs	and	attitudes	correspond	with	the	mind-independent	moral	reality.	But	antirealists	argue	that	this	is	troubling	in	light	of	the	fact	that	our	cognitive	faculties	are	the	result	of	a	messy	and	highly	contingent	evolutionary	history	(Joyce	2006;	Street	2006).	Realists	have	some	answers	to	this.	They	try	to	argue	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	pleasure/pain	and	the	moral	properties	of	goodness/badness	and	since	evolutionary	processes	are	sensitive	to	the	former,	there	is	a	reason	to	believe	that	our	evolved	cognitive	faculties	would	pick	up	on	these	deeper	moral	truths	(Enoch	2011;	Skarskaune	2011;	Wielenberg	2014).	Who	comes	out	top	in	this	debate	is	unimportant;	the	important	point	is	that	realists	generally	agree	that	they	owe	the	antirealists	some	account	of	moral	epistemology,	i.e.	that	unless	their	metaethical	theory	incorporates	an	epistemic	condition	(one	that	explains	how	we	can	come	to	know	what	is	moral)	it	is	deficient	in	some	respect	(Enoch	2010).	My	contention	is	that	the	proponent	of	DCT	is	in	a	similar	position	to	the	non-natural	realist:6	they	can	ignore	moral	epistemology	if	they	wish,	but	this	means	that	their	attempt	to	provide	a	grounding	for	morality	ends	up	being	much	less	plausible.		
																																																								
6 Not least because DCT is itself a species of non-natural moral realism, albeit slightly different from the version 
described in the text. 
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	 To	sum	up,	I	think	that	premise	(1)	of	the	epistemological	objection	is	sound.	Any	proponent	of	the	DCT	that	adopts	the	Adamsian	social	and	communicative	version	of	DCT	would	seem	bound	to	accept	that	knowledge	of	God’s	communicative	acts	(i.e.	commands)	is	an	essential	precondition	for	the	existence	of	an	obligation.	And	any	proponent	of	the	DCT	(or	voluntarism	more	broadly)	that	wishes	to	hang	tough	and	insist	upon	the	separation	of	moral	epistemology	and	ontology	faces	a	problem:	their	theory	becomes	much	less	plausible	if	they	fail	to	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	because	epistemic	conditions	are	included	among	the	standard	lists	of	moral	platitudes	that	any	satisfactory	metaethical	theory	ought	to	account	for.	
	
	
4.	Defending	the	second	premise:	Why	RNBs	lack	the	requisite	knowlege	
	Premise	(2)	is	the	real	sticking	point	of	the	epistemological	objection.	That	premise	has	two	parts	to	it.	The	first	part	claims	that	there	are	such	things	as	
reasonable	non-believers	(i.e.	non	believers	who	violate	no	epistemic	duties	in	their	nonbelief);	the	second	part	claims	that	these	non-believers	lack	epistemic	access	to	God’s	commands	(i.e.	that	they	cannot	know	what	God	has	obligated	them	to	do).				 I	have	relatively	little	to	say	in	defence	of	the	first	part.	There	are	three	reasons	for	this.	The	first	is	that	I	think	this	element	of	the	argument	may	be	the	one	toward	which	proponents	of	DCT	should	direct	most	of	their	energy.	I	return	to	this	point	in	the	final	section.	The	second	is	that,	notwithstanding	what	I	have	just	said,	I	think	that	others	have	already	proffered	admirable	defences	of	the	existence	of	such	non-believers	(e.g.	Schellenberg	2007),7	and	I	have	nothing	new	to	add	to	such	defences.	Certainly,	I	like	to	think	of	myself	as	a	reasonable	non-believer,	someone	who	was	once	happy	to	believe,	but	who	lost	their	belief	in	the	course	of	an	honest	search	for	the	truth.	I	also	think	the	existence	of	numerous	people,	both	past	and	present,	for	whom	belief	in	God	was	never	a	live	option	(for	demographic	or	historical	reasons)	is	good	support	for	the	existence																																																									
7 Schellenberg now prefers the term nonresistant nonbelief for reasons we will not get into. We stick with the term 
reasonable nonbelief on the grounds that it is still being used in the literature on the epistemological objection to 
DCT (e.g. Morriston 2009; Peoples 2011; and Wielenberg 2014). 
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of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	The	third	reason	I	have	little	to	say	in	defence	of	their	existence	is	that	I	think	the	argument	may	not	be	limited	to	them	anyway.	As	will	become	clear	in	the	discussion	below,	I	also	think	that	there	are	particular	classes	of	believers	who	are	vulnerable	to	the	same	problem.	Nevertheless,	I	keep	the	scope	limited	to	reasonable	non-believers	at	the	outset	because	I	think	the	best	case	can	be	made	in	relation	to	them.			 This	brings	us	to	the	second	part	of	premise	(2).	This	is	perhaps	the	most	crucial	element	of	the	argument	and	the	one	upon	which	most	attention	has	focused.	The	prima	facie	defence	of	it	is	straightforward:	reasonable	non-believers	do	not	believe	in	God.	Consequently,	they	cannot	interpret	anything	in	the	world	as	being	a	command	emanating	from	God.	To	take	an	obvious	example,	they	do	not	believe	that	Bible	is	the	divinely	inspired	word	of	God.	Thus,	they	cannot	believe	that	the	ten	commandments	are	really	divine	commands.	Consequently,	they	do	not	know	that	these	are	moral	obligations	(if	indeed	they	are).	This	is	just	an	example.	According	to	premise	(2),	any	candidate	moral	obligation	under	DCT	will	fall	foul	of	the	same	basic	problem.			 Theists	have	developed	responses	to	this	prima	facie	defence.	These	defences	typically	start	out	by	arguing	for	an	enriched	understanding	of	the	possible	forms	of	divine	communication.	God,	we	are	told,	need	not	simply	communicate	to	us	via	a	revealed	text,	he	can	also	communicate	to	us	via	conscience,	moral	intuition,	natural	law	(all	understood	as	forms	of	general	revelation)	and	special	revelation.8	Once	we	have	this	enriched	understanding	of	the	forms	of	communication,	we	can	start	to	see	how	it	is	possible	for	a	reasonable	non-believer	to	acquire	the	requisite	moral	knowledge.	Two																																																									
8 Several authors make this point about the diverse forms of divine communication. Peoples (2011) summarises 
the contributions to the debate. See also Evans (2013), pp 37-45 on the different ways in which God’s commands 
may be promulgated. As one of the anonymous reviewers to this paper pointed out, missing from the list provided 
in the text are Kant’s suggested methods for using reason to arrive at moral knowledge in the Groundwork on the 
Metaphysics of Morals (2012/1785 at 4: 401-402 and 4:421-424) and Critique of Practical Reason (2015/1788 at 
5:25). The Kantian method would seem to deliver moral obligations as dictates/commands of reason. But it is 
noteworthy in this regard that Kant did not think that the moral law had an author. He thought God had a role to 
play in morality, but that it was a regulative/practical role, not a constitutive/grounding role. He argued that we 
needed to postulate God in order to make it practical to attain the highest good (2015/1788 at 5: 113-132), but that 
the content of the moral law itself was grounded solely in reason. This Kantian view of God’s role in the moral 
order is different from the one being targeted by the epistemological objection. On this interpretation of Kant’s 
argument, see Byrne (2011). 
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arguments	in	particular	can	be	used	to	support	this	conclusion.	I	call	them	them	the	‘content-not-source’	argument	and	the	‘probability-possibility’	argument.	I	deal	with	them	both	in	turn.		
4.1	–	The	Content	not	Source	Argument	The	‘content	not	source’	argument	comes	from	the	work	of	Robert	Adams,	as	modified	and	expanded	by	Glenn	Peoples,	and	from	the	work	of	C.	Stephen	Evans.	It	is	the	leading	response	in	the	current	literature.	I’ll	consider	both	the	Adams/Peoples’	version	and	the	Evans	version	separately	since,	although	they	are	quite	similar	in	their	overall	thrust,	there	are	some	subtle	and	important	differences	between	them.			 Let’s	start	with	the	Adams/Peoples’	version.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Adams	is	one	of	the	proponents	of	DCT	who	concedes	the	link	between	ontology	and	epistemology.	He	thinks	that	the	DCTist	owes	some	account	of	how	it	is	that	people	come	to	know	what	is	commanded	of	them.	To	do	this,	Adams	offers	an	account	of	what	it	would	take	for	God	to	successfully	issue	a	moral	command.	This	results	in	something	I	shall	call	‘Adams’s	Communicative	Standard’.	It	has	three	elements	to	it:		
Adams’s	Communicative	Standard:	‘In	my	opinion,	a	satisfactory	account	of	these	matters	will	have	three	main	points.	(1)	A	divine	command	will	always	involve	a	sign,	as	we	may	call	it,	that	is	intentionally	caused	by	God.	(2)	In	causing	the	sign	God	must	intend	to	issue	a	command,	and	what	is	commanded	is	what	God	intends	to	command	thereby.	(3)	The	sign	must	be	such	that	the	intended	audience	could	understand	it	as	conveying	the	intended	command.’	(Adams	1999,	265)		The	first	two	conditions	are	unproblematic.	We	can	readily	concede	that	God,	if	He	exists,	would	have	the	power	to	intentionally	cause	the	creation	of	signs	that	convey	his	commands.	The	crucial	condition	is	the	third.	It	is	this	one	that	allegedly	causes	problems	for	the	epistemological	objection.	For	when	you	look	at	it,	this	condition	is	claiming	that	access	to	God’s	commands	does	not	
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specifically	require	knowledge	of	the	source	of	the	command.	It	only	requires	knowledge	of	what	is	being	commanded.	This	creates	a	problem	for	the	epistemological	objection	because	when	you	factor	in	the	different	possible	forms	of	divine	communication	(i.e.	the	different	possible	‘signs’)	then	you	can	imagine	cases	in	which	the	reasonable	non-believer	knows	what	is	morally	required	of	them	thanks	to	a	divinely	communicated	sign,	even	though	they	lack	knowledge	of	the	sign’s	origins.	Peoples	illustrates	the	idea:		“Consider	for	example	the	possibility	that	God	conveys	the	“sign”	to	people	
regarding	some	act	(let’s	pick	murder)	via	a	proper	function	of	the	human	
conscience.	Nobody	needs	to	know	what	conscience	is,	how	we	got	one,	or	that	God	
uses	it	to	ensure	that	we	have	some	true	beliefs	in	order	for	them	to	know,	via	
conscience,	that	murder	is	wrong...”		
	(Peoples	2011)		In	short,	reasonable	non-believers	can	know	the	content	of	moral	commands	without	knowing	their	source.			 There	are	at	least	two	difficulties	with	this	version	of	the	argument.	The	first	has	to	do	with	how	Adams’s	communicative	standard	ought	to	be	understood.	To	work,	the	third	condition	in	this	standard	must	state	that	knowledge	of	content	is	all	that	is	required.	But	Adams’s	original	wording	suggests	that	knowledge	of	form	is	needed	as	well.	After	all,	he	says	that	you	must	understand	the	sign	as	‘conveying	the	intended	command’,	suggesting	that	the	agent	to	whom	the	command	is	directed	must	know	that	they	are	being	commanded	to	do	something.	This	is	problematic	because	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	reasonable	nonbelievers	have	epistemic	access	to	both	the	form	and	the	
content	of	the	divine	commands.	Such	a	nonbeliever	might	have	the	phenomenological	feeling	that	murder	is	wrong	and	that	they	ought	not	to	do	it,	but	may	nevertheless	have	no	sense	that	they	are	being	commanded	to	refrain	from	it.	Wielenberg	puts	the	point	nicely	when	he	says	that	‘[t]here	is	a	difference	between	commanding	someone	to	perform	a	certain	act	A	and	causing	
	 14	
someone	to	believe	that	he	is	morally	obligated	to	perform	act	A.’	(Wielenberg	2014,	79).	All	that	is	happening	in	Peoples’s	imagined	case	is	that	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	is	being	caused	to	that	murder	is	very	bad;	not	that	they	are	being	caused	to	believe	that	they	are	being	commanded	not	to	murder.	This	suggests	that	insisting	that	the	moral	agent	must	have	knowledge	of	the	form	and	content	is	not	going	to	be	sufficient	to	rebut	the	epistemological	objection.			 It	is	probably	for	this	reason	that	Peoples	insists	on	a	pure	‘content	not	source’	objection,	going	so	far	as	to	explicitly	state	that	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	‘does	not	even	need	to	know	that	[what	is	being	communicated	to	him]	is	a	command,	provided	the	command	can	be	conveyed	to	him’	(Peoples	2011).	This	seems	to	be	a	more	sensible	but	here	we	run	into	a	second	major	difficulty.	Once	you	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	alone	is	sufficient	for	the	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition	you	seem	to	undermine	the	criterion	that	the	DCTist	uses	to	distinguish	genuine	moral	obligations	from	other	obligation-like	claims	on	our	moral	agency..The	essence	of	DCT	is	that	an	obligation	is	moral	only	if	it	is	commanded	by	a	being	with	the	right	kinds	of	properties	that	can	create	truly	moral	obligations.	But	if	a	particular	moral	agent	does	not	know	that	their	conscience-delivered	moral	beliefs	derive	from	such	a	being,	it	is	very	difficult	to	see	how,	on	DCT,	moral	obligations	are	supposed	to	exist	for	that	agent.	Communication	of	the	source	would	seem	to	be	essential	to	successful	communication	of	the	command.		The	theist	may	insist	that	the	obligations	still	exist	in	some	objective,	agent-independent	sense,	but	then	they	are	moving	away	from	a	communication-based	theory	of	moral	obligation,	and	ending	up	with	a	more	general	theological	stateist	view.9				 We	see	the	problem	in	the	case	of	the	modified	version	of	the	DCT	defended	by	Adams.	One	part	of	the	motivation	for	this	modified	DCT	was	to	come	up	with	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	Euthyphro	dilemma.	This	was	achieved	by	insisting	that	God	has	the	right	kind	of	essence	or	nature	to	issue	moral	directives.	Another	part	of	the	motivation	for	Adams’s	modified	DCT	was	the	need	to	distinguish	between	obligatory	and	supererogatory	acts.	Our																																																									
9 The problems with this move are discussed briefly in the final section. 
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conscience	may	often	tell	us	what	is	morally	good	and	what	is	morally	bad;	indeed,	it	may	often	go	so	far	as	to	tell	us	that	something	is	really	really	good	or	really	really	bad.	But	it’s	not	clear	that	conscience	alone	is	sufficient	for	knowledge	of	obligations,	certainly	for	many	hotly	disputed	moral	issues.	Am	I	obligated	give	large	chunks	of	my	money	to	charities	in	the	developing	world,	just	as	I	would	be	obligated	to	rescue	a	drowning	child,	or	is	that	merely	superogatory?	Adams’s	point	is	that	we	need	a	being	with	the	right	mix	of	properties	and	the	right	kind	of	authority	to	help	us	tell	the	difference.	If	we	don’t	know	that	the	pangs	of	conscience	we	experience	in	relation	to	charitable	giving	are	command-like	signs	from	such	a	being,	how	are	we	to	know	what	we	are	obligated	to	do?				 Allied	to	this,	and	more	importantly,	there	is	the	problem	that	(moral)	command-like	signs	are	cheap	and	easy-to-fake.	Humans	can	create	books	claiming	to	contain	God’s	commands	but	which	are	actually	made	up	to	satisfy	their	own	selfish	political	needs;	preachers	can	claim	to	channel	God’s	commands	in	their	sermons	for	their	own	nefarious	purposes;	more	outlandishly	(but	consistent	with	certain	religious	worldviews)	there	could	be	demons	or	devils	interfering	with	our	moral	consciences	and	telling	us	that	certain	things	are	right	or	wrong	even	when	they	are	not.	All	of	these	cases	could	result	in	command-like	signs	being	communicated	to	moral	agents,	but	none	of	them	result	in	the	creation	of	moral	obligations.	Why	not?	Because	in	each	case	we	would	know	or	have	reasonable	doubt	about	the	authority	of	their	sources.	Knowledge	of	the	source	is	thus	crucial	if	we	are	to	distinguish	moral	commands	from	fakes	and	for	those	commands	to	be	successfully	communicated	to	us.	In	the	end,	then,	it	is	very	difficult	to	see	how	a	proponent	of	the	Adamsian-style	DCT	could	insist	that	knowledge	of	content	by	itself	is	sufficient	for	the	satisfaction	of	the	epistemic	condition.	For	them,	it	is	the	source	of	the	commands	that	makes	all	the	difference			 Is	there	any	way	to	avoid	this	problem?	C.	Stephen	Evans	tries	valiantly	to	do	so.	In	its	initial	steps,	his	argument	is	the	same	as	that	provided	by	Adams/Peoples.	He	agrees	with	Adams	and	Peoples	that	knowledge	of	the	
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content	of	God’s	commands	is	essential	if	moral	obligations	are	to	exist	(Evans	2013,	37).	Indeed,	he	admits	that	‘it	is	hard	to	see	how	an	unknowable	moral	obligation	could	be	an	obligation	at	all’	(Evans	2013,	38).	He	goes	on	to	claim	that	conscience	is	a	key	source	of	moral	knowledge	and	that	conscience	is	open	to	all,	believer	and	non-believer	alike	(2013,	41).	Conscience,	according	to	him,	gives	us	an	immediate	intuitive	knowledge	of	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	our	actions,	although	he	admits	that	the	knowledge	it	provides	may	be	‘highly	fallible’	(2013,	41).	Where	Evans	differs	from	Adams/People	is	in	offering	a	more	precise	diagnosis	of	where	it	is	that	the	proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	goes	wrong	and	why	it	is	that	knowledge	of	the	source	of	commands	is	not	necessary	for	moral	knowledge.10	As	he	puts	it,	the	proponent	of	DCT	must:		“defend[]	the	claim	that	God’s	commands	can	generate	obligations	even	for	those	
who	do	not	recognize	those	commands	as	coming	from	God.	To	do	this	two	
distinctions	must	be	made.	First	one	must	distinguish	between	a	recognition	of	a	
moral	obligation	and	the	recognition	of	a	moral	obligation	as	a	divine	command.	
This	distinction	in	turn	requires	that	one	distinguish	a	recognition	of	a	moral	
obligation	from	an	explanation	of	the	existence	of	a	moral	obligation.	The	defender	
of	DCT...	must	hold	that	it	is	possible	for	a	reasonable	non-believer	to	recognize	a	
moral	obligation	without	realizing	that	the	obligation	is	in	fact	a	divine	command.	
This	ignorance...may	prevent	the	non-believer	from	being	able	to	give	an	adequate	
explanation	of	the	existence	of	the	moral	obligation,	but	there	are	many	cases	in	
which	a	person	may	reasonably	accept	the	existence	of	something,	but	lack	an	
adequate	explanation	of	the	existence	of	something.		(Evans	2013,	112-113)		There	is	a	lot	going	on	in	this	quoted	passage,	but	the	essence	of	it	is	this:		
Evans’s	Epistemic	Condition:	On	DCT,	a	RNB	can	have	knowledge	of	a	moral	obligation	M	provided	that	they	can	recognise	that	M	is	a	moral	obligation;																																																									
10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to engage with this aspect of Evans’s argument. 
Minor textual note: Evans refers to the epistemological objection as the ‘promulgation objection’. The 
terminological difference is unimportant here. 
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they	do	not	need	to	have	an	adequate	explanation	of	why	M	is	a	moral	obligation	in	order	to	have	the	requisite	knowledge.		His	argument	then	is	that	reasonable	non-believer	can	recognise	the	existence	of	certain	moral	obligations	(a)	because	their	consciences	will	reveal	to	them	that	particular	actions	are	right/wrong	and	(b)	because	they	are	familiar	with	other	kinds	of	obligations	from	their	social	lives	(like	Adams,	Evans	develops	his	DCT	by	analogy	with	the	obligations	arising	in	social	life).	They	do	not	need	a	deeper	explanation	of	why	it	is	that	the	particular	obligation	is	a	moral	obligation.				 Evans	uses	a	lengthy	analogy	to	defend	this	point.	I	discuss	that	analogy	in	the	next	section	because	it	raises	additional	problems.	We	don’t	need	it	to	understand	the	flaw	in	Evans’s	argument.	The	flaw	stems	from	Evans’s	attempt	to	distinguish	the	explanation	of	M	from	knowledge	of	M	in	the	context	of	DCT.	The	attempted	separation	is	understandable:	DCT	is,	after	all,	usually	proferred	as	an	explanatory	grounding	for	moral	obligations	that	we	already	believe	ourselves	to	have.	It	states	that	the	reason	why	we	have	those	moral	obligations	is	because	God	commanded	them	to	be	moral	requirements.	But	the	proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	is	highlighting	is	that	the	attempted	separation	of	explanation	and	recognition	is	not	possible	in	the	case	of	DCT.	There	is	an	intimate	connection	between	knowledge	of	moral	obligations	and	the	kind	of	explanation	of	the	existence	of	moral	obligations	that	DCT	purports	to	provide.				 It	is	easiest	to	make	this	point	by	way	of	analogy.	Consider	the	fact	that	many	people	prefer	to	eat	organic	food.	But	organic	food	is	not	simply	any	old	food,	it	is	food	that	is	produced	by	a	particular	causal	mechanism,	namely:	an	organic	farming	method	(i.e.	one	that	is	free	from	chemical	fertilisers,	pesticides	and	so	on).	Consequently,	for	people	who	prefer	organic	food,	it	is	essential	that	they	know	that	the	food	they	consume	is	produced	by	organic	farming	methods.	In	many	countries,	official	certifications	and	food	labels	are	used	to	provide	consumers	with	knowledge	of	organic	farming	methods.	Provided	the	consumer	has	faith	in	the	food	labelling	and	certification	system,	they	can	be	reasonably	confident	that	any	food	they	purchase	with	the	relevant	labels	and	certifications	
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is	indeed	organic	in	nature.	If	such	a	consumer	wanders	down	a	food	aisle	in	a	supermarket	and	sees	food	on	the	selves,	they	might	be	able	to	recognise	that	food	qua	food	by	its	general	appearance,	but	they	cannot	recognise	it	qua	organic	food,	until	they	see	the	relevant	label	certifying	the	process	by	which	it	is	produced.	In	this	scenario,	knowledge	of	the	process	that	produced	the	food	
explains	why	the	food	counts	as	organic	food,	but	knowledge	of	that	process	is	essential	for	the	consumer	if	they	are	to	recognise	the	food	qua	organic	food.	So	in	this	case,	the	ability	to	recognise	X	qua	organic	food	is	not	separable	or	distinguishable	from	an	explanation	of	why	X	counts	as	organic	food.11			 The	analogy	with	the	case	of	DCT	and	moral	obligations	should	be	straightforward,	but	let	me	spell	it	out.	The	essential	claim	of	DCT	is	that	a	moral	obligation	is	not	simply	any	old	obligation	(or	obligation-like	sign/command)	–	we	have	lots	of	those	in	society	as	it	is;	it	is	an	obligation	that	is	produced	by	the	right	causal	mechanism	(i.e.	by	a	command	issued	by	God).	Consequently,	on	DCT,	for	people	who	want	to	know	their	moral	obligations,	it	is	not	enough	that	they	recognise	M	as	an	obligation-like	sign/command,	they	must	know	that	it	was	produced	by	the	right	causal	mechanism.	Without	that	knowledge	they	may	be	able	to	recognise	M	qua	obligation	but	they	will	not	be	able	to	recognise	M	
qua	moral	obligation.	Now,	it	is	true	that	the	divine	causal	origin	is	also	what	explains	why	M	is	a	moral	obligation,	but	that	is	exactly	the	point	that	the	proponent	of	the	epistemological	objection	is	making:	explanation	of	moral	obligations	is	not	distinguishable	from	recognition	of	moral	obligations,	given	the	way	in	which	DCT	purports	to	explain	the	existence	of	moral	obligations.	That’s	the	essence	of	the	epistemological	objection:	that	given	the	kind	of	metaethical	grounding	that	DCT	provides	for	moral	obligations	it	is	not	possible	to	separate	explanation	from	knowledge.	Consequently,	the	content-not-source	objection	does	not	work.																																																											
11 There is of course one crucial difference between the cases, but this merely strengthens the epistemological 
objection to DCT. Organic food will continue to be organic food even if it is mislabeled. But on DCT, a moral 
obligation will not continue to be a moral obligation unless it is successfully communicated and, according to what 
is being argued here, it is not successfully communicated until knowledge of its source is provided. 
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4.2	–	The	Probability-Possibility	Argument	Is	there	another	way	to	defend	DCT	from	the	epistemological	objection?	Perhaps.	One	thing	that	the	preceding	analysis	assumes	is	that	the	RNB	completely	(and	reasonably)	denies	the	existence	of	God	and	so	they	are	epistemically	closed	to	the	possibility	of	moral	obligations	emanating	from	God.	But,	of	course,	that	might	not	be	a	fair	representation	of	their	phenomenology.	The	RNB	is	likely	to	be	(or	have	been)	open	to	the	possibility	of	there	being	a	God,	and	thus	to	harbour	some	potential	doubt	as	to	the	source	of	their	moral	beliefs.	Is	there	any	way	in	which	this	doubt	can	be	leveraged	into	a	defence	of	the	DCT?	Evans	(2013)	hints	at	this	in	his	writings,	as	do	others.12	As	far	as	I	am	aware,	however,	no	one	has	offered	an	extended	defence	and	analysis	of	this	suggestion.	I	thus	have	two	goals	in	this	section.	The	first	is	to	present	this	argument	–	which	I	call	the	‘probability-possibility’	argument	–	in	what	I	believe	to	be	its	most	persuasive	form;	the	second	is	to	critique	it.			 We	can	understand	the	gist	of	the	argument	by	considering	an	extended	thought	experiment	from	Evans.	This	is	presented	as	part	of	his	defence	of	the	‘content-not-source’	objection	but	its	wording	and	structure	it	is	not	fully	analogous	with	a	pure	version	of	that	objection.	This	is	because,	as	you	will	see	in	the	quoted	passage	below,	it	focuses	on	a	scenario	that	combines	uncertainty	as	to	the	source	of	a	command	with	knowledge	of	the	content	of	a	command,	and	not	on	a	scenario	that	just	involves	knowledge	of	a	command.	The	thought	experiment	is	worth	quoting	in	full:			
“Suppose	I	am	hiking	in	a	remote	region	on	the	border	between	Iraq	and	Iran.	I	
become	lost	and	I	am	not	sure	exactly	what	country	I	am	in.	I	suddenly	see	a	sign,	
which	(translated)	reads	as	follows:	“You	Must	Not	Leave	This	Path”.	As	I	walk	
further,	I	see	loudspeakers,	and	from	them	I	hear	further	instructions:	“Leaving	the	
path	is	strictly	forbidden.”	In	such	a	situation	it	would	be	reasonable	for	me	to	form																																																									
12 One of the reviewers to this paper suggested that when considering the alleged status of a moral obligation under 
DCT “[t]he RNB can still examine the commands and properties of the alleged God of DCT, and can even 
specifically consider the claim that God has employed conscience or natural law to communicate his moral will, as 
well as verbal commands.” This suggests a scenario in which the RNB is at least open to God as a possible source. 
Is being open to this possibility enough to generate knowledge of an obligation? That’s they question pursued in 
the text.  
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a	belief	that	I	have	an	obligation	to	stay	on	the	path,	even	if	I	do	not	know	the	
source	of	the	commands.	For	all	I	know13	the	commands	may	come	from	the	
government	of	Iraq	or	the	government	of	Iran,	or	perhaps	from	some	regional	arm	
of	government,	or	even	from	a	private	landowner	whose	property	I	am	on.	In	such	a	
situation	I	might	reasonably	believe	that	the	commands	communicated	to	me	
create	obligations	for	me,	even	if	I	do	not	know	for	sure	who	gave	the	commands.”			(Evans	2013,	113)		There	are	three	essential	features	to	this	thought	experiment:	(i)	there	is	a	sign	communicating	a	command;	(ii)	there	is	uncertainty	as	to	the	true	source	of	that	sign;	and	(iii)	there	is	the	probability/possibility	that	it	came	from	someone	with	the	right	kind	of	authority.	The	conjunction	of	these	three	features	is	thought	to	provide	knowledge	that	is	sufficient	to	generate	an	obligation	to	obey.	The	idea	then	is	that	the	situation	faced	by	the	reasonable	non-believer	is	similar.	Hence	there	might	be	knowledge	sufficient	to	generate	an	obligation	to	obey	in	their	case	too.				 There	are	two	ways	in	which	to	interpret	this	argument.	One,	which	I	shall	call	the	pragmatic	enrichment	interpretation,	seems	to	be	implied	by	Wielenberg	in	his	response	to	Evans’s	argument	(Wielenberg	2014).	Pragmatic	enrichment	is	the	well-known	linguistic	phenomenon	whereby	the	meaning	of	an	utterance	is	enriched	by	the	pragmatic	context	in	which	it	was	uttered.14	So,	for	example,	I	might	say	to	you	‘Close	all	the	doors’.	In	saying	this	I	am	issuing	a	command,	but	what	does	it	require	you	to	do?	I	surely	cannot	mean	for	you	to	close	all	the	doors	in	the	world.	That	would	be	extreme,	but	that	interpretation	is	consistent	with	the	literal	meaning	of	the	utterance.	As	it	happens,	however,	I	say	this	to	you	while	we	are	sitting	in	a	room	with	two	open	doors.	This	is	the	pragmatic	context	in	which	the	command	was	issued.	Given	that	pragmatic	context,	you	rightly	interpret	the	command	to	mean	that	you	should	close	the																																																									
13 This phrasing seems crucial. It suggests that, within the thought experiment, there is a live epistemic possibility 
that the commands come from some particular source. 
14 Linguistic philosophers distinguish between semantics, which has to do with the general conventional meanings, 
and pragmatics, which has to do with the token-specific properties of an utterance. 
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two	open	doors.	The	meaning	has	thus	been	enriched	by	the	context.	Pragmatic	enrichment	of	this	sort	is	a	routine	feature	of	ordinary	conversations	and	communications.	Speakers	and	listeners	share	a	set	of	assumptions	and	understandings	about	how	the	world	works.	That	set	of	assumptions	always	influences	what	we	take	to	a	reasonable	or	plausible	interpretation	of	that	utterance.	The	idea	would	be	that	the	receiver	of	any	command-like	sign	makes	certain	background	assumptions	about	the	reasonable	way	in	which	to	interpret	those	commands,	and	those	assumptions	might	include	the	possibility	of	them	emanating	from	God.			 There	is	a	problem	with	this	interpretation	of	the	argument.	Evans’s	original	thought	experiment	only	works	exploits	shared	background	knowledge	about	the	pragmatic	context	in	which	the	obligation-imposing	sign	is	produced.	We	all	know	that	the	Iran-Iraq	border	is	subject	to	political-legal	control	(i.e.	that	there	are	authorities,	be	they	public	or	private,	who	control	the	land	in	that	region).	We	also	know,	given	the	contested	nature	of	that	landscape,	that	these	political-legal	authorities	may	have	good	reason	for	telling	people	to	stay	on	the	path.	These	shared	assumptions	make	it	plausible	for	us	to	interpret	the	sign	in	an	obligation-imposing	way.	The	problem	is	that	these	shared	assumptions	about	pragmatic	context	evaporate	in	the	case	of	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	who	is	trying	to	interpret	allegedly	obligation-imposing	signs.	The	reasonable	nonbeliever	does	not	think	that	his	or	her	conscience	is	the	product	of	a	divine	will,	or	that	the	local	preacher	has	a	hotline	to	God,	or	that	the	Bible	is	a	divinely	inspired	text.	They	do	not	share	those	assumptions	with	the	believers.	Consequently,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	they	could	understand	those	signs	as	commands	coming	from	a	potentially	legitimate	authority	(Wielenberg	2014,	79).				 There	is,	however,	another	way	in	which	to	understand	the	argument.	Wielenberg’s	claim	that	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	won’t	interpret	the	sign	as	being	a	command	only	really	works	in	the	case	of	moral	conscience	or	intuition.	In	the	case	of	signs	communicated	via	a	holy	text	or	through	the	medium	of	a	prophet/preacher,	the	command-like	form	of	the	sign	may	be	obvious	enough.	In	those	cases,	the	pragmatic	enrichment	interpretation	misses	the	crucial	role	that	
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moral	uncertainty	seems	to	play	in	Evans’s	thought	experiment.	We	can	pay	due	homage	to	that	role	by	considering	the	argument	in	light	of	the	burgeoning	literature	on	the	topic	of	moral	uncertainty	(Lockhart	2000;	Sepielli	2008;	Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011;	Weatherson	2014;	Harman	2015).				 We	need	some	background	first.	The	current	debate	about	moral	uncertainty	was	kickstarted	by	a	number	of	philosophers	(Lockhardt	2000;	Guererro	2007;	Moller	2011)	claiming	that	uncertainty	as	to	the	moral	status	of	an	act	should,	on	at	least	some	occasions,	influence	our	decision-making	with	respect	to	that	act.	It	has	long	been	accepted	that	uncertainty	with	respect	to	our	factual	beliefs	should	influence	our	moral	decision-making;	the	moral	uncertaintists	merely	claimed	that	the	same	should	be	true	with	respect	to	our	moral	beliefs.	Analogies	and	stories	can	illustrate	their	point.	Consider	the	following	two	examples	(adapted	from	Weatherson	2014):		
Poisoning:	Alice	is	caring	for	her	sick	friend	Bob.	She	has	a	bottle	containing	what	she	believes	to	be	useful	but	non-essential	medication.	But	she	is	only	90%	certain	of	this.	She	knows	that	there	is	a	10%	risk	that	the	bottle	contains	a	lethal	poision	that	would	instantly	kill	Bob.		
Vegetarianism:	Rotimi	is	invited	to	a	meal	at	her	friend’s	house.	Steak	is	on	the	menu,	but	there	is	also	a	vegetarian	option.	She	is	90%15	certain	that	eating	meat	is	morally	permissible,	but	she	accepts	that	there	is	a	10%	risk	that	eating	meat	is	gravely	morally	wrong	(nearly	as	bad	as	killing	and	eating	an	innocent	human	being).		The	first	case	involves	factual	uncertainty,	i.e.	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	contents	of	the	bottle.	There	is	no	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	morality	of	lethally	poisoning	one’s	friend.	Most	people	accept	that	the	factual	uncertainty	in	this	case	should	influence	the	outcome:	given	that	the	medication	is	useful	but	non-essential,	there	is	no	way	Alice	should	run	the	risk	of	lethally	poisoning	Bob.																																																									
15 Obviously these figures are misleadingly precise. No one could accurately estimate the truth of their moral 
beliefs like this. In reality, we would have to estimate subjective probability ranges. The precise figures are used 
for illustrative purposes only. 
	 23	
Moral	uncertaintists	argue	that	similar	reasoning	applies	to	Rotimi’s	case.	But	in	that	case	the	uncertainty	is	directly	related	to	moral	beliefs,	not	factual	ones.16	Rotimi	is	not	sure	about	the	ethical	status	of	eating	meat.	It	could	be	permissible	but	it	could	also	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	In	that	context,	the	uncertaintist	will	argue	that	she	ought	not	to	run	the	moral	risk	of	doing	something	that	could	be	gravely	morally	wrong.	She	should	take	the	less	risky	option.			 The	Rotimi	example	highlights	an	argumentative	structure	that	is	common	throughout	the	literature	on	moral	uncertainty,	something	we	can	call	the	risk	asymmetry	argument	(Weatherson	2014;	Moller	2011).	The	gist	of	the	argument	is	that	when	an	agent	is	faced	with	two	or	more	options,	one	of	which	has	a	non-negligible	probability	of	being	gravely	morally	wrong,	the	other	of	which	is	pretty	certain	to	be	morally	permissible,	they	ought	not	take	the	potentially	gravely	morally	wrong	option.	If	this	sounds	somewhat	similar	to	the	argumentative	structure	underlying	Pascal’s	Wager,	then	be	reassured:	it	is	effectively	a	moral	version	of	it.			 Evans’s	thought	experiment	can	be	reinterpreted	in	light	of	the	concepts	and	argumentative	structures	used	in	the	debate	about	moral	uncertainty.	The	thought	experiment	focuses	on	a	scenario	in	which	(a)	there	is	some	uncertainty	regarding	the	moral	status	of	a	sign	(i.e.	whether	it	is	obligation-imposing)	and	(b)	where	uncertainties	with	respect	to	the	moral	status	of	the	sign	are	sufficiently	asymmetrical	to	generate	a	moral	obligation	to	follow	the	sign.	In	the	case	of	the	sign	on	the	Iran-Iraq	border,	the	uncertainty	stems	from	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign.	One	might	argue	that	this	isn’t	really	moral	uncertainty	at	all	since	the	truth	regarding	the	origin	or	source	of	the	sign	is	factual	in	nature,	not	moral.	But	that	isn’t	quite	right.	Although	the	distinction	between	factual	and	moral	beliefs	is	fuzzy,	the	whole	point	of	the	Iran-Iraq	thought	experiment	is	that	the	source	of	a	command	determines	its	normative	status.	If	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	obligation-imposing;	if	it	does	not	come	from	a	legitimate	authority,	it	is	not.	The	concept	of																																																									
16 Of course, some people will argue that moral beliefs are factual since moral propositions are capable of being 
true or false. I don’t dispute this and although I think the distinction between the moral and the non-moral is fuzzy, 
I think the distinction is clear enough for this discussion to make sense. 
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legitimate	authority	is	itself	highly	moralised,	so	it	is	difficult	to	see	this	as	anything	other	than	a	type	of	moral	uncertainty.17	This	applies	a	fortiori	to	cases	in	which	the	uncertainty	with	respect	to	the	origin	concerns	whether	or	not	God	is	the	source	of	the	sign	since	God	functions	as	the	legitimate	authority	for	moral	obligations.			 The	thought	experiment	also	structures	the	risk	asymmetries	in	such	a	way	that	the	obligation-imposing	interpretation	of	the	sign	is	the	most	compelling.	It	is,	after	all,	based	in	a	disputed	region	between	two	historically	belligerent	nations.	In	that	context,	it	seems	highly	likely	that	the	sign	comes	from	someone	with	the	right	kind	of	authority,	and	that	one	would	be	running	a	grave	moral/legal	risk	by	not	following	the	command.18	But	this	is	where	the	thought	experiment	unravels	if	it	attempts	to	provide	broader	support	for	DCT.	The	thought	experiment	seems	to	involve	a	scenario	in	which	we	are	90%	sure	that	the	command	comes	from	a	legitimate	authority.	It	is	easy	enough	to	see	how	that	degree	of	confidence	might	suffice	to	generate	belief	in	the	obligation.	The	tougher	case	(and	the	one	that	is	presumably	more	analogous	with	the	case	of	the	reasonable	nonbeliever)	would	be	where	the	probabilities	are	stacked	the	other	way	around,	i.e.	we	are	90%	sure	the	signs	do	not	come	from	the	right	source,	but	think	there	is	a	10%	chance	that	they	do.	Would	that	be	sufficient	to	generate	belief	in	an	obligation?	It	might	be,	though	it	would	presumably	depend	on	the	potential	moral	status	of	disobeying	the	command.	If	walking	off	the	path	confers	no	obvious	moral	benefits,	then	we	might	agree	that	the	non-negligible	risk	that	the	sign	is	obligation-imposing	is	sufficient	to	generate	belief	in	that	obligation.	But	if	there	are	moral	benefits	from	disobedience,	the	situation	might	be	rather	different.	The	risk	asymmetry	may	work	the	other	way.		
																																																								
17 It is certainly no different than the kind of uncertainty regarding whether a foetus is a person or a non-human 
animal an entity with the right not to killed for our consumption. Uncertainty with respect to those kinds of beliefs 
is accepted as an example of moral uncertainty in the existing literature (Moller 2011). That said, I readily 
acknowledge that some critics of moral uncertainty think there are subtle distinctions between moral and non-
moral facts that may make a crucial difference in this debate (e.g. Harman 2015 and Weatherson 2014). Since I 
ultimately appeal to the views of these critics in the response to Evans, I don’t believe that my view is in tension 
with theirs. 
18 The thought experiment also layers prudential risk on top of legal/moral risk, with the risk asymmetries working 
in the same way. This makes it doubly compelling. 
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	 Consider	how	the	reasoning	would	apply	to	the	case	of	the	reasonable	non-believer.	The	idea,	presumably,	would	be	that	the	nonbeliever	is	also	confronted	with	a	sign	(e.g.	a	pang	of	conscience,	or	an	utterance	from	a	holy	book	or	a	preacher	etc);	and	that	they	are	uncertain	as	to	the	true	source	of	that	sign.	They	are	reasonably	confident	(say	90%)	that	it	does	not	come	from	a	being	with	legitimate	authority	to	create	commands	(i.e.	God)	but	they	accept	that	there	is	a	non-negligible	probability	that	it	does	(say	10%).	The	claim	then	would	probability	of	the	sign	coming	from	the	right	source	is	sufficient	for	the	reasonable	nonbeliever	to	know	that	they	are	under	an	obligation	and	that	this	in	turn	is	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	epistemic	condition	of	DCT.19				 The	are	four	problems	with	this	as	an	attempt	to	ward	off	the	epistemological	objection.	The	first	is	theological	in	nature.	I	think	it	is	questionable	whether	this	sort	of	uncertainty-based	view	of	communication	is	compatible	with	the	properties	of	God	as	traditionally	conceived.	One	would	presume	that	God	has	the	power	to	communicate	clearly	to	us	that	he	is	the	source	of	a	particular	sign;	just	as	our	local	legislature	has	the	power	to	do	the	same.	The	fact	that	he	does	not,	for	at	least	some	people,	and	that	he	consequently	has	to	leverage	uncertainty	in	the	manner	just	outlined	seems	surprising.	The	theist	owes	us	some	justification/explanation	for	why	God	has	to	adopt	such	an	imperfect	system	of	communication.	Theists	will	no	doubt	oblige	by	offering	explanations	that	are	broadly	similar	to	those	provided	in	response	to	the	problem	of	evil	or	the	problem	of	divine	hiddenness	(e.g.	Evans	2013,	114-115).	But	there	is	one	problem	with	all	such	attempts	to	explain	away	the	uncertainty.	Remember	what	is	at	stake	if	the	epistemic	condition	is	not	satisfied?	Moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	a	certain	segment	of	the	population.	The	theist	needs	to	explain	why	God	is	entitled	to	run	the	risk	of	excluding	people	from	the	realm.of	moral	duty.	For	instance,	a	typical	theodical	response	to	the	problem	of	evil	is	to	argue	that	God	cannot	intervene	to	prevent	evil	because	it	would	compromise	our	ability	to	develop	and	acquire	true	moral	agency,	where	this	agency	consists	in	the	ability	to	recognise	right	or	wrong,	freely																																																									
19 This interpretation of the argument subsumes the preceding pragmatic enrichment interpretation because what is 
now being alleged is that uncertainty with respect to the pragmatic context is sufficient for successful 
communication of the command. 
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decide	one’s	actions,	and	take	moral	responsibility	for	the	outcomes.	A	theist	might	be	tempted	to	offer	a	similar	response	in	this	instance,	arguing	that	God	doesn’t	communicate	his	will	to	us	perfectly	in	order	to	give	us	the	freedom	to	develop	our	own	moral	agency.	But	this	theodicy	is	not	going	to	work	in	the	present	context.	If	the	divine	communication	fails,	it	isn’t	simply	the	case	that	the	non-believer	is	left	to	develop	their	own	moral	agency	without	the	guiding	hand	of	God;	it	is	that	moral	obligations	cease	to	exist	for	this	agent	and	hence	there	is	no	moral	agency	for	them	to	develop.	This	would	actually	defeat	the	rationale	for	the	alleged	theodicy.					 The	second	reason	I	think	this	is	not	a	plausible	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that	the	impact	of	moral	uncertainty	on	our	obligations	is	itself	hotly	disputed.	Although	several	authors	think	that	moral	uncertainties	and	risk	asymmetries	can	combine	to	alter	the	content	of	our	obligations	(Moller	2011;	Lockhart	2000;	Guerrero	2007),	there	are	others	who	have	challenged	this	belief	(Weatherson	2014;	Harman	2015).	Weatherson	for	instance	argues	that	one	problem	with	taking	moral	uncertainties	onboard	in	one’s	practical	reasoning	is	that	it	results	in	a	type	of	moral	fetishism:	one	acts	for	the	moral	good	whatever	ever	that	may	
be,	not	for	the	reasons	that	typically	motivate	moral	action	(e.g.	because	an	act	does	harm).	In	essence,	the	uncertaintist	acts	morally	de	dicto	rather	than	de	re.	Harman	agrees	with	this	de	dicto/de	re	distinction	and	adds	the	observation	that	the	uncertaintist	position	rests	on	the	mistaken	belief	that	false	moral	beliefs	can	exculpate.	We	cannot	adjudicate	on	these	arguments	here,	but	if	there	is	indeed	something	suspicious	about	the	uncertaintist’s	position	it	casts	into	doubt	this	rendering	of	the	argument.		
		 The	third	reason	for	doubting	this	defence	of	the	DCT	is	that	if	you	accept	that	non-negligible	probabilities	can	alter	the	status	of	a	‘moral’	sign,	you	start	down	a	slippery	slope.	There	are	plenty	of	other	non-negligible	probabilities	that	could	lead	to	a	very	different	interpretation	of	the	allegedly-divine	signs.	For	a	non-believer,	the	probability	of	God’s	existence	may	be	roughly	on	a	par	with	the	existence	of	other	supernatural	beings	with	similar	powers	(e.g.	Evil	God,	the	devil,	demons,	angels	etc.).	When	confronted	with	a	putatively	divine	sign	(such	
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as	a	pang	of	conscience)	they	may	recognise	the	non-negligible	risk	that	it	emanates	from	God,	alongside	a	similar	non-negligible	risk	that	it	emanates	from	another	supernatural	being	like	the	devil	or	a	demon.	But,	of	course,	if	the	sign	comes	from	one	of	these	other	sources,	it	wouldn’t	be	obligation-imposing.	Quite	the	contrary:	it	might	be	the	devil	trying	to	trick	the	person	into	doing	something	genuinely	malicious	or	evil.	In	that	case,	they	would	be	running	a	grave	moral	risk	by	following	the	sign.	The	risk	asymmetries	may	thus	counsel	against	viewing	the	sign	as	obligation-imposing.	In	short,	risk-based	analyses	of	this	sort	can	cut	both	ways.	I	suspect	it	will	most	often	cut	against	the	theistic	interpretation	in	the	case	of	the	typical	reasonable	non-believer.	In	fact	it	is	even	worse	than	that	because	the	same	problem	applies	to	a	significant	group	of		
believers.	Many	believers	think	that	the	devil’s	existence	is	highly	probable.	For	them	–	more	so	than	the	reasonable	non-believer	–	the	risk	of	misinterpreting	a	sign	is	far	higher.	They	may	find	themselves	paralysed	in	cases	where	the	source	of	the	sign	is	uncertain.	The	same	may	be	true	for	those	who	embrace	the	skeptical	theist	position.	Many	have	argued	that	skeptical	theism	undermines	our	epistemic	confidence	in	allegedly	divine	signs	to	similarly	paralysing	effect	(Maitzen	2007;	Wielenberg	2010;	Law	2014).		This	suggests,	incidentally,	that	the	epistemological	objection	could	have	a	far	broader	scope	than	originally	assumed.	It	could	be	a	problem	for	believer	and	nonbeliever	alike.			 Finally,	I	think	the	response	fails	because	for	many	reasonable	non-believers	the	probability	of	God’s	existence	may	be	truly	negligible.	Most	defenders	of	the	view	that	moral	uncertainty	can	alter	our	understanding	of	our	moral	obligations	accept	that	this	only	holds	true	when	the	risks	in	question	are	non-negligible	(e.g.	Moller	2011).	So	if	the	probability	of	God’s	existence	is	negligible,	the	argument	will	not	work.			 To	briefly	sum	up,	the	probability/possibility	argument	has	some	interesting	features,	and	is	hinted	at	in	the	literature,	but	even	after	developing	it	in	what	I	believe	to	be	a	charitable	form,	I	find	it	unsatisfactory	as	a	response	to	the	epistemological	objection.			
	 28	
	 5.	Conclusion:	Assessing	the	implications		 The	preceding	discussion	points	to	one	conclusion:	the	epistemological	objection	–	in	the	form	presented	–	is	plausible.	Divine	Command	Theories	really	do	incorporate	an	epistemic	condition	into	their	account	of	moral	ontology;	that	condition	fails	to	be	satisfied	for	a	sizeable	class	of	nonbelievers;	and	the	result	is	that	moral	obligations	fail	to	exist	for	that	class	of	nonbelievers.	At	this	point	we	return	to	the	question:	so	what?	Is	this	something	that	should	bother	the	proponent	of	DCT?	Or	can	they	simply	shrug	off	the	objection?	There	are	several	possibilities.			 If	one	is	of	a	universalist	persuasion	when	it	comes	to	God	and	the	moral	law	(i.e.	believes	that	everyone	is	subject	to	the	same	moral	law),	then	one	should	be	disturbed	by	the	argument.	It	is	suggesting	that	a	significant	proportion	of	the	population	are	outside	the	realm	of	God’s	moral	law,	able	to	act	with	impunity	and	without	moral	consequence.	At	the	very	least,	this	would	seem	to	be	a	significant	practical	problem;	and	more	likely	a	deep	theological	problem.				 If	one	is	persuaded	by	the	notion	that	metaethical	theories	battle	it	out	by	earning	more	plausibility	points,	then	one	should	also	be	disturbed	by	the	argument.	It	suggests	that	the	DCT	misses	one	important	mark	because	it	has	no	way	to	account	for	the	moral	obligations	of	reasonable	non-believers.	This	might	mean	that	the	believer	should	rest	their	hopes	on	an	alternative	theistic	metaethical	theory.	This	strikes	me	as	being	the	most	compelling	interpretation	of	the	argument	since	epistemic	conditions	would	seem	to	be	an	important	component	in	any	moral	theory.				 That	said,	a	hard	line	interpretation	is	also	available.	The	theist	could	insist	on	the	pure	separation	of	epistemology	and	ontology.	This	would	probably	require	a	retreat	to	a	more	general	theological	stateist	position,	and	not	a	command-based	view	based	on	successful	communication.	In	that	case,	the	theist	could	argue	that	their	account	of	moral	ontology	is	internally	consistent	(even	if	
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it	fails	to	account	for	moral	knowledge),20	and	then	simply	note	that	the	epistemological	objection	merely	confirms	their	worst	suspicions	about	an	atheistic	worldview:	It	turns	out	that	even	reasonable	atheists	really	are	beyond	the	moral	pale.			 This	may,	in	turn,	point	the	way	back	to	the	neglected	part	of	the	argument:	the	existence	of	reasonable	nonbelievers.	Although	I	think	the	existence	of	such	nonbelievers	is	highly	likely,	I	admit	that	I	have	a	bias.	The	best	hope	for	the	proponent	of	the	DCT	might	be	to	challenge	the	reality	of	reasonable	nonbelievers.				
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